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Abstract
Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game
theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture
more elaborate games, and how hard it is computationally to optimize and solve such games.
One prominent such language is the simple yet expressive Weighted Graph Games (WGGs)
representation [14], which maintains knowledge about synergies between agents in the form of
an edge weighted graph.
We consider the problem of finding the optimal coalition structure in WGGs. The agents
in such games are vertices in a graph, and the value of a coalition is the sum of the weights
of the edges present between coalition members. The optimal coalition structure is a partition
of the agents to coalitions, that maximizes the sum of utilities obtained by the coalitions. We
show that finding the optimal coalition structure is not only hard for general graphs, but is
also intractable for restricted families such as planar graphs which are amenable for many other
combinatorial problems. We then provide algorithms with constant factor approximations for
planar, minor-free and bounded degree graphs.
1 Introduction
Consider a set of agents who can work in teams. Some agents work well together, while others
find it hard to do so. When two agents work well together, a team which contains both of them
can achieve better results due to the synergy between them. However, when agents find it hard
to work together, a team that contains both agents has a reduced utility due to their inability to
cooperate, and may perform better when one of them is removed. How should we best partition
agents into teams to maximize the total utility generated?
Cooperation is a central issue in algorithmic game theory, and cooperative games are very
useful for modeling team formation and negotiation in many domains. In such games, agents form
coalitions to pursue a joint cause, and must decide how to split the gains they derive as a group.
Much of previous literature explores settings where only one coalition can be formed. However,
in many scenarios agents can form multiple disjoint coalitions, where each coalition can obtain its
profits independently. An important goal is to partition the agents in a way that maximizes the
total value gained by all coalitions, i.e. the social welfare. This problem is known as finding the
optimal coalitional structure.
Cooperative game theory provides tools to reason about how to best partition the agents into
team or how the utility generated by an agent team should be allocated to its members. The key
piece of information used by such game theortic tools is the amount of utility any team of agents
could potentially generate. Since an agent team, sometimes called a coalition is simply a subset
∗A short version of this paper is to appear at AAAI 2013
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of agents, the number of different coalitions is exponential in the number of agents. The mapping
between any agent coalition and the utility it can generate lies at the heart of any cooperative
game, and is called the characteristic function of the game.
One possible way to represent the characteristic function is by simply listing down this utility for
any possible coalition. Generally any coalition may have a different value, so a na¨ıve representation
requires storage exponential in the number of agents. This emphasizes the need for a succinct
representation.
In many domains it is possible to use knowledge about specific features of the domains and
provide a more succint representation of the characteristic function. However, even for such succint
representations, reasoning about the game may still be computationally hard. Previous work in
algorithmic game theory has examined many such representation languages for cooperative games
and the computational complexity of calculating various solutions in them. For general surveys
of such representations, see [10, 30, 9]. Some approaches guarantee a polynomial description, but
only represent restricted games [24, 14]. Others can represent any game, but require exponential
storage in the worst case [19, 4]. We examine coalition structures in the prominent Weighted Graph
Games (WGG) model of [14]. In WGGs, agent synergies are expressed using a graph, where agents
are vertices and the weight of an edge connecting two agents expresses how well they work together.
A positive weight indicates they can coordinate well, yielding a positive contribution to a coalition
containing both. The edge’s weight expresses how much utility can be derived from the cooperation
of the two agents. A negative weight indicates the agents do not work well together, diminishing
the utility of a team containing both. Again, the edge’s weight expresses the reduction in utility
of a coalition that contains both agents. This graph representation allows expressing synergies in
coalitions that agents form.1
Our contribution: We study optimal coalition structures in WGGs. We prove that finding the
optimal coalition structure in WGGs is hard even for restricted families of graphs such as planar
graphs. We provide constant factor approximation algorithms for planar, minor-free and bounded
degree graphs.
Note that the objective function that we study coincides with the Correlation Clustering func-
tional [8] up to an additive constant. Due to this additive shift existing approximability results
for Correlation Clustering such as those in [31, 21] do not translate to our problem. We believe
that the additive normalization that we use is quite natural in our context. To our knowledge, we
are the first to study approximation schemes for this functional.
Preliminaries: A transferable utility (TU) coalitional game is composed of a set of n agents,
I, and a characteristic function mapping any subset (coalition) of the agents to a rational value
v : 2I → Q, indicating the total utility these agents achieve together. We follow the Coalition
Structure (CS) model of [1], where agents can form several teams simultaneously. A coalition
structure is a partition of the agents into disjoint coalitions. Formally, CS = (C1, . . . , C l) is a
coalition structure over I if ∪li=1Ci = I and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for all i 6= j; The set CS(I) denotes all
possible coalition structures on I.
We overload notation and denote v(CS ) =
∑
Cj∈CS v(C
j). Our focus in this paper is on
the coalitional structure generation problem, of finding the optimal coalition structure CS∗, with
maximal value. Given a game 〈I, v〉, an optimal coalition structure CS∗ ∈ CS(I) is a partition
that maximizes welfare, i.e. for any other CS ∈ CS(I) we have v(CS) ≤ v(CS∗). We denote the
problem of finding an optimal coalition structure as OPT-CS. OPT-CS is equivalent to a complete
set partitioning problem where all disjoint subsets of the set of all agents are possible. The set
partitioning problem was studied in [35] and shown to be NP-hard. However, we focus on OPT-CS
where inputs are restricted to WGGs [14].
We now review the Weighted Graph Games (WGGs) model [14].
1Group buying sites (e.g. LivingSocial and Groupon) reward social recommendations, so WGGs can capture
synergies from including enough friends of a consumer to make her buy a good.
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Definition 1. WGGs are games played over a graph G = 〈V,E〉, with edge weights w : E → Q.
The agents are the vertices, so I = V , and the characteristic function is the sum of the weights on
the graph induced by the coalition. Given a coalition C ⊆ V , we denote the edges induced by the
coalition as EC = {e = (u, v) ∈ E|u, v ∈ C}. The characteristic function is v(C) =
∑
e∈EC w(e).
As noted in [14] WGG cannot represent all games. We allow at most one edge between any two
vertices (parallel edges may be merged, summing the weights).
2 Finding the Optimal Coalitional Structure
We first formally define the OPT-CS problem.
Definition 2 (OPT-CS-WGG). Given a WGG 〈I, v〉 and a rational number r, test if the value of
the optimal coalitional structure for this game is at least r, i.e. if there is CS ∈ CS(I) such that
v(CS) ≥ r. We denote an optimal structure as CS∗ ∈ arg maxCS∈CS(I) v(CS).
2.1 Hardness Results
We first discuss why OPT-CS-WGG is hard. As our contribution lies in providing tractable
algorithms for restricted cases, we only provide sketches for hardness results. It is quite easy to show
hardness for general graphs using a reduction from Independent Set (IS). IS is the problem of testing
if there is a subset of vertices of size k with no edges between them in an input graph G = 〈V,E〉.
Theorem 5 is a stronger result, so we only provide a sketch of the proof (for completeness a detailed
proof is given in the appendix).
Theorem 3. OPT-CS-WGG is NP-complete, and assuming P 6= NP, there is no polynomial time
O(n1/2−)-approximation algorithm for it where n is the number of vertices and  is any positive
constant. There is no polynomial time O(n1−)-approximation algorithm for this problem unless
NP = ZPP.
Proof. We reduce an IS instance 〈G = 〈V,E〉 , k〉 to an OPT-CS-WGG instance. The reduced
graph G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉 has all vertices and edges of G (so V ⊆ V ′ and E ⊆ E′), and an additional
vertex s. The weights of the original edges are all set to be −k (where k > |V |). Vertex s is
connected to each vertex in v ∈ V with an edge e of weight w(e) = 1. G has an independent set
of size k iff there exists a partition for G′ with value k. This is a parsimonious reduction between
IS and OPT-CS-WGG. H˚astad proved that there is no polynomial time O(n1/2−)-approximation
algorithm for IS assuming P 6= NP, and no polynomial time O(n1−)-approximation algorithm for
IS unless NP = ZPP [18].
The above result shows that OPT-CS-WGG has no good approximation for general graphs.
It might seem that the hardness comes from having to avoid all negative edges, as we can make
the weights of the negative edges very low to make sure that they are not present in the optimal
solution. However, we show OPT-CS-WGG is hard and inapproximable even when all weights have
the same absolute value, using an involved reduction from IS to the problem of OPT-CS-WGG
where all edges are either +1 or −1, denoted OPT-CS-WGG±1.
Theorem 4. OPT-CS-WGG±1 is NP-complete. Assuming P 6= NP, there is no polynomial time
O(n1/2−)-approximation algorithm for it where n is the number of vertices of the graph, and 
is any positive constant. There is no polynomial time O(n1−)-approximation algorithm for this
problem unless NP = ZPP.
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Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, we reduce an Independent Set instance G = 〈V,E〉 to
a OPT-CS-WGG instance. The reduced graph G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉 contains all the vertices and edges
of G (so V ⊆ V ′ and E ⊆ E′), and one additional vertex s. The weights of the original edges
are identical, and are all w(e) = −1 (this is where the reduction differs from that of Theorem 3).
Vertex s is connected to any vertex in v ∈ V with an edge e with weight w(e) = +1.
If the optimal coalition structure has value k′ in graph G′, we show we can find an independent
set of size at least k′/9 in G. As in the previous reduction, all positive edges are incident to vertex
s. Thus every vertex is either in the coalition of vertex s or in a separate single-vertex coalition.
Let S be the set of vertices from graph G in the coalition of vertex s. The value of coalition S is
thus the value of the entire coalition structure. Suppose there are a vertices in S, and b negative
edges between vertices of S. In this case, the sum of all weights of positive edges for S is equal to
a, and the sum of all weights of negative edges in S is −b. Therefore, k′ = a− b, so a > k′. Also
note that b < a.
Now consider the subgraph G[S]. The number of edges in this graph, b, is not more than the
number of vertices a. Therefore, the average degree is at most 2 in this subgraph. Thus, the
number of vertices with degree at least 3 in this subgraph is not more than 2a/3, so there are at
least a/3 vertices with degree at most 2.
Let S′ be the set of vertices with degree at most 2 in the subgraph G[S]. Now consider the
subgraph G[S′]. This subgraph has at least a/3 vertices, each with a degree at most 2. We can
pick 1/3 of the vertices of this subgraph as an independent set: we just pick a vertex arbitrarily,
put it in our independent set and remove its neighbors, which are no more than two vertices. Thus,
in the worst case, for every three vertices, we choose one for our independent set. This way, we
can find an independent set of size at least a/9 ≥ k′/9, so our reduction loses a factor of at most
9, but the same hardness results hold asymptotically.
OPT-CS-WGG remains hard even for planar graphs. Independently of us [33] examine a
related coalition structure generation problem for a graph representation language. Their repre-
sentation is combinatorially richer, so hardness results do not generally carry over to the simpler
WGG representation. However, their proof that generating the optimal coalition structure where
their graph representation is planar does carry over to the simplified WGG setting. We also provide
an alternative proof in the appendix. This yields Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. OPT-CS-WGG in planar graphs is NP-complete.
Proof. Given in [33]; An alternative proof is given in the appendix.
2.2 Exact Algorithms for Bounded Treewidth Graphs
For completeness, we first consider OPT-CS-WGG restricted to graphs of bounded treewidth.
Lemma 6 is a special case of Lemma 7 from [11].2
Lemma 6. OPT-CS-WGG with inputs restricted to trees (or forests) is in P.
Proof. Let P ⊆ E be the set of edges with positive weights, and N ⊆ E be the edges with negative
weights. For an edge subset A we denote its total weight as w(A) =
∑
e∈Aw(e). Note that for
any structure CS we have v(CS) ≤ w(P ). We show that for trees the optimal structure CS∗ has
v(CS∗) = w(P ). A very simple partitioning to two sub coalitions X,Y suffices for this. We begin
with an arbitrary leaf v, and put it in one of the sub coalitions, so v ∈ A. For any neighbor u of
v, so e = (v, u) ∈ E, we choose a sub coalition for u based on w(e). If w(e) > 0 we put u in the
2We decided to include Lemma 6 since (i) its proof is much simpler than that of Lemma 7; (ii) it provides a
distributed (local) algorithm for partitioning. Two neighbors are in the same coalition if and only if their connecting
edge has positive weight; (iii) it shows that for forests, there is a simple solution that achieves all positive edges, and
avoids all negative edges.
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same sub coalition as v, and if w(e) < 0 we put u in the other sub coalition. We then continue
the process from the vertex u, until we deplete all the vertices in the graph. Since the graph is a
tree, any edge with negative weight has one vertex in X and the other in Y , and is not counted
for the value of the coalition structure, while every positive weight edge has both its vertices in
the same sub coalition, and is counted for the value of the coalition structure. Thus we have
v(CS∗) = w(P ). The partitioning can be done using a simple breadth first search, in polynomial
time of O(|V |+ |E|).
Lemma 7 ([11]). For k-bounded treewidth graphs (constant k), OPT-CS-WGG is in P.
2.3 Constant Factor Approximation for Planar Graphs
We provide a polynomial time constant approximation algorithm for planar graph games. Planar
graphs model many real-world domains. For example, consider coalitions between countries. In
many domains, synergies would only exist between neighbouring countries. We can define a graph
game where countries have an edge between them only if they are neighbours, resulting in a planar
graph. Our method achieves a coalition structure avoiding all negative edges and gains a constant
portion of the weights of the positive edges. The optimal value is at most the sum of the positive
weights, yielding a constant approximation. First we define feasible sets which play an important
role in our algorithm.
Definition 8. Given a planar graph G, denote by E+ the set of positive edges, and by E− the set
of negative edges. A subset E′ ⊆ E+ is a feasible set iff there is a partition P of vertices such that
any edge e ∈ E′ is contained in one part of the partition, while all negative edges are cross-part
edges. We say P achieves E′.
We find partitions that achieve feasible sets E1, E2, · · · , Ek (each a subset of E+), whose union
∪ki=1Ei is E+. Each positive edge is thus achieved by at least one of these k partitions. The value
of partition i is at least
∑
e∈Ei w(e) as we avoid all negative edges in our partitions, making the
value of a partition be the sum of the positive weights achieved by it. The union of these k feasible
sets is the set of all positive edges. Thus the sum of the values of the k partitions is at least the
sum of all positive weights. Picking the maximal value partition, we obtain a k-approximation
algorithm. Our algorithm finds few such partitions that still cover all positive edges. In our
algorithm we present a constant number of these partitions (feasible sets). We start with building
some principal feasible sets that we use later in our algorithm. The first building block (feasible
set) is a matching.
Lemma 9. Every matching M ⊆ E+ is a feasible set. In other words, there is a partition that
avoids all negative edges, and achieve edges of M .
Proof. Let e1, e2, · · · , ea be the edges of a matching. We build a partition of the vertices. We
have a clusters for the a edges of our matching. We put both endpoints of ei in cluster i. There
are n − 2a remaining vertices as well. We put them in n − 2a separate single-vertex clusters,
so we achieve the edges of M in this partition. We show we avoid all negative edges. Suppose
not, so there is a negative edge e′(u, v) such that u and v are in the same cluster. Thus u and v
are endpoints of an edge in the matching as well, so there are two edges between u and v in to
contradiction to our assumption of having no parallel edges.
The second building block is slightly more elaborate. We prove that the union of vertex-disjoint
stars can be covered using at most three feasible sets. A star is a subgraph formed of several edges
that all share one endpoint called center vertex. In other words, a star is a vertex with some edges
to some other vertices, and there are no other edges in the star between vertices.
Lemma 10. We can cover a union of several vertex-disjoint stars using at most 3 feasible sets.
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Proof. Assume there are l stars with center vertices v1, v2, · · · , vl. In the star i, vertex vi has edges
to vertex set Si. The sets S1, S2, · · · , Sl are disjoint and they do not contain any of the center
vertices. We know that graph G is planar, and therefore we can find a proper four-coloring for it.
Consider vertex vi. Non of the vertices in set Si has the color of vertex vi, so the vertices of set
Si are colored using only three colors. Without loss of generality, assume they are colored with
colors 1, 2, 3. Let Si,1 be the set of vertices in Si with color one. Similarly we define sets Si,2 and
Si,3. We do this for all center vertices. Note that there is no edge inside set Si,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and
1 ≤ j ≤ 3. But there might be edges between different sets. Now here is the first partition that
gives us the first feasible set. We put vi and all vertices of Si,1 in one cluster, and we do this for
all center vertices. So for each center vertex, we have a separate cluster. All remaining vertices of
the graph go to separate single-vertex clusters. We achieve the edges between vertex vi, and all
vertices in Si,1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. We avoid all negative edges because there is no edge inside set Si,1,
and there is no negative edge between vertex vi, and set Si,1. Similarly we use two other partitions
to get the edges between vi and sets Si,2 and Si,3. So we can cover all these edges using three
feasible sets.
Lemma 11. The edges of a forest can be covered using 6 feasible sets.
Proof. We show the proof for one tree. The same should be done for other trees. Make the tree
T rooted at some arbitrary vertex r. Now every vertex in the tree has a unique path to r. We
color the edges of this tree using two colors, red and blue. The edges that have an odd distance
to r are colored red, and the edges with even distance to r are blue. So the first level of edges
that are adjacent to r are colored blue, the next level edges are red, and so on. So we start from
r, and alternatively color edges blue and red. Considering the subgraph of blue edges, we cannot
find a path of length four (3 edges) in it, and we know that there is no cycle in the graph. Thus,
these blue edges can form only some disjoint stars. The same proof holds for the red edges. Using
Lemma 10, we cover the blue edges with three feasible sets, and the red edges with another three
feasible sets. So, using at most 6 feasible sets, every edge is covered in the tree.
Now we just need to show that the set of positive edges in G can be decomposed into a few
number of forests. This can be implied by a direct application of Nash-Williams Theorem [22].
Let G+ be the subgraph of G with all positive edges. Clearly G+ is also planar. Nash-Williams
Theorem states that the minimum number of forests needed to partition the edges of a graph
H is equal to maxS⊆V (H)
mS
nS−1 where mS , and nS are the number of edges and vertices in set
S respectively. V (H) is the set of all vertices in graph H. Since G+ is planar, mS is at most
3nS − 6 for every S ⊆ V (G+) which implies that three forests are sufficient to cover all edges
of G+. We should note that computing these forests can be done in polynomial time as Gabow
and Westerman [15] provided a polynomial time algorithm that makes Nash-Williams theorem
constructive. We conclude that all positive edges in G can be covered with 3× 6 = 18 feasible sets
which yields an 18-approximation algorithm.
2.4 Minor Free Graphs
We generalize our results to Minor Free Graphs. A graph H is a minor of G if H is isomorphic
to a graph that can be obtained by zero or more edge contractions on a subgraph of G. G is
H-Minor Free, if it does not contain H as a minor. A graph is planar iff it has no K5 or K3,3 as
a minor [34] (K5 is a complete graph with 5 vertices, and K3,3 is a complete bipartite graph with
3 vertices in each part). We give an O(h2 log h)-approximation algorithm for OPT-CS-WGG in
H-minor free graphs where h is the number of vertices of graph H. This yields a constant factor
approximation for planar graphs in particular, because they are K5-minor free graphs. We use the
following theorem [32]. The main property of Minor Free graphs that make them tractable in this
problem is sparsity.
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Theorem 12. The number of edges of a H-Minor Free graph G with n vertices is not more than
cn where c is equal to (α + o(1))h
√
log h, h is the number of vertices in H, and α is a constant
around 0.319.
Our algorithm for planar graphs used sparsity to make sure that there are low degree vertices
at each level and we also need to make sure that the graph is colorable with a few colors. Using
sparsity we can find a proper coloring of these graphs using 2c+ 1 colors. Any subgraph G′ of G
is also H-Minor Free, so its number of edges is at most O(c|G′|). Thus the average degree of every
subgraph of G is at most 2c, so in every subgraph of G, we can find some vertices with degree at
most 2c (the average degree). We use this to get a proper 2c+ 1-coloring of G. Let v be a vertex
in G with degree at most 2c. Clearly G \ {v} is also H-minor free, and inductively we can find a
proper 2c+ 1-coloring for it. Vertex v has at most 2c neighbors, so one of the 2c+ 1 colors is not
used by its neighbors. Thus we can find one appropriate color for v among our 2c+ 1 colors, and
consequently have a proper 2c+ 1-coloring for G.
Using theorem 12, we know that every subset S of G has at most c|S| edges because every
subgraph of G is also H-minor free. We can then use the Nash-Williams Theorem [22], and
Gabow and Westerman Algorithm [15] to cover all positive edges of G with O(c) forests. We
also know that each forest can be decomposed into two unions of stars. The entire graph G is
colorable using 2c + 1 colors, so we need 2c + 1 − 1 = 2c feasible sets to cover a union of stars.
We conclude that 2c · 2 ·O(c) = O(c2) feasible sets are enough to cover all positive edges, and get
a O(c2) approximation algorithm by picking the best (maximum weight) feasible set. Since c is
O(h
√
log h), our approximation factor is O(h2 log h).
2.5 Bounded Degree Graphs
We now consider bounded degree graphs. A vertex’s positive degree is the number of positive edges
incident to it. Denote the maximum positive degree in G as ∆. Using the Vizing Theorem, the
positive edges can be decomposed into ∆ + 1 matchings (which are also feasible sets). This yields
a ∆ + 1 approximation algorithm. A polynomial time algorithm for finding the decomposition can
be derived from the Vizing Theorem’s proof. We give a linear time algorithm for this problem: a
randomized (2 + )∆ approximation with an expected running time O(E log ∆/) and O(V + E)
space3 where E is the number of edges.
We pick an arbitrary ordering of the positive edges of the graph, and try to decompose them
into (2 + )∆ matchings. We color the edges with (2 + )∆ colors such that no two edges with
the same color share an endpoint. Assume that we are in step i, and wish to color the i-th edge
in our ordering. Let e be this edge with endpoints u and v. We have already colored i − 1 edges
and some of those colored edges may have u or v as their endpoints, so we must avoid the color of
those edges. For each vertex, we keep the color of its edges in a data structure. Initially the data
structures for all vertices are empty. When we color an edge, we add its color to the data structure
of its two endpoint vertices. We can use binary search trees to insert and search in O(log ∆) time,
since we insert at most ∆ colors in each data structure. For edge e, we must find a color that is
not in the union of the data structures of vertices u and v. There are at most 2(∆ − 1) colors
in these two data structures, and there are (2 + )∆ colors in total. Thus if we randomly pick a
color, with probability at least /2, we can use this color for edge e. Checking whether a color
is in a data structure can be done using a search query. Thus we can check in time O(log ∆)
whether the randomly chosen color is good or not. If the color is already taken, we can try again.
It takes at most 2/ times in expectation to find an available color. Thus for each edge we spend
O(log ∆/) time to find a color, so the average running time of this decomposition is O(E log ∆/)
3According to an anonymous reviewer, there are techniques to get rid of the log ∆ factor in the running time
which results in higher space complexity of O(E + V · ∆) instead of the linear space in our algorithm.
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in expectation. Finding the best feasible set (matching) does not take more than O(E) time. Thus
we get an (2 + )∆-approximation with almost linear running time.
2.6 Treewidth Based Approximations
Many hard problems are tractable for graphs with constant or bounded treewidth. We present a
polynomial time O(k2)-approximation algorithm where k is the treewidth of the graph, without
assuming that the treewidth of graph G is constant or a small number. Algorithms for finding the
treewidth of a graph only work in polynomial time when the treewidth is constant. Although we
do not know the treewidth, we can still make sure that the approximation factor is not more than
O(k2). We use the following lemma.
Lemma 13. If G has treewidth k, it has a vertex with degree at most k.
Proof. Since G has treewidth k, there is a tree T such that every vertex of T has a subset of size
at most k + 1 of vertices of G. The vertices of T that contain a vertex of G form a connected
subtree. We also know that the endpoint vertices of each edge in G are in the set of at least one
vertex of T together. Now we can prove our claim. Consider a leaf v of T . Let u be the father
of v. These two vertices have two subsets of vertices of G like Su and Sv. If Sv is a subset of Su,
there is no need to keep vertex v in our tree. We can delete it from T , and the remaining tree is
also a proper representation of graph G. So we know that there is at least a vertex of G like x
which is in Sv, and not in Su. Clearly v is the only vertex of T that contains x. Otherwise the
vertices of T that contain x do not form a connected subgraph. So vertex x can have neighbors
only in set Sv which means that x has at most k + 1− 1 = k neighbors.
Removing a vertex from a graph does not increase its treewidth, so we can iteratively find
vertices of degree at most k, and delete them. Thus we can find a (k + 1) proper coloring of
vertices of G. We use the same decomposition we used for planar graphs, so we decompose the
positive edges into O(k) matchings and unions of stars. Each matching is a feasible set, and each
union of stars can be decomposed into k + 1− 1 = k feasible sets, as we can color the graph with
k + 1 colors. Thus O(k2) feasible sets are enough to cover all positive edges yielding an O(k2)
approximation algorithm. Note that we start with a value of k, and we keep deleting vertices with
degree at most k. If every vertex is deleted after some number of iterations, we achieve the desired
structure. Otherwise at some point the degree of each vertex is greater than k, indicating that
the treewidth is more than k. Thus, we can find the minimum k for which every vertex is deleted
after some steps, and that k is at most the treewidth of G.
3 Conclusions and Related Work
Cooperation is a central topic in algorithmic game theory. We considered computing the optimal
coalition structure in WGGs. We showed that the problem is NP-hard, but restrictions on the
input graph, such as being a tree or having bounded treewidth result in tractable algorithms for the
problem. We showed the problem is hard for planar graphs, but provided a polynomial constant
approximation algorithm for this class and other classes.
WGGs are a well-known representation of cooperative games, and offer a simple and concise
way of expressing synergies. One limitation of our approach is that some cooperative games cannot
be expressed as a WGG. A general representation of a cooperative game is a table mapping any
subset of the agents to the utility it can achieve (i.e. a table with size exponential in the number of
the agents). Although the WGG representation is very concise for some games, and requires much
less space than the exponential size table, some games cannot be expressed as WGGs. Further,
even for games given in another representation language and that can be expressed as WGGs,
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there does not always exist a tractable algorithm for converting the game’s representation to a
WGG. To use our methods, one must have the input game given as a WGG. Since the WGG
representation is a very prominent representation language for cooperative games, we believe our
approach covers many important domains.
Much work in algorithmic game theory has been dedicated to team formation, cooperative game
representations and methods for finding optimal teams game theoretic solutions. Several papers
describe representations of cooperative domains based on combinatorial structures [14, 19, 4, 23, 6]
and a survey in [9]. A detailed presentation of such languages is given in [10, 30]. Generation
of the optimal coalition structure received much attention [29, 27, 26, 25] due to its applications,
such as vehicle routing and multi-sensor networks. An early approach [29] focused on overlapping
coalitions and gave a loose approximation algorithm. Another early approach [27] has a worst case
complexity of O(nn), whereas dynamic programming approaches [35] have a worst case guarantee
of O(3n). Such algorithms were examined empirically in [20].
Arguably, the state of the art method is presented in [25]. It has a worst case runtime of
O(nn) and offers no polynomial runtime guarantees, but in practice it is faster than the above
methods. All these methods assume a black-box that computes the value of a coalition, while
we rely on a specific representation. Another approach solves the coalition structure generation
problem [4], but relies on a different representation. A fixed parameter tractable approach was
proposed for typed-games [2] (the running time is exponential in the number of agent “types”).
However, in graph games the number of agent types is unbounded, so this approach is untractable.
In contrast to the above approaches, we provide polynomial algorithms and sufficient conditions
that guarantee various approximation ratios for WGGs [14].
This paper ignored the game theoretic problem of coalitional stability. While the structures
we find do maximize the welfare, they do so in a potentially unstable manner. When agents are
selfish, and only care about their own utility, the coalition structure may be broken when some
agents decide to form a different coalition, improving their own utility at the expense of others.
It would be interesting to examine questions relating to solution concepts such as the core, the
nucleolus or the cost of stability[17, 28, 5, 3].
Several directions remain open for future research. First, since solving the coalition structure
generation problem is hard for general WGGs, are there alternative approximation algorithms?
Obviously, one can use the algorithms for general games, however we believe a better complexity
can be achieved for WGGs than for general games. Second, focusing on the game theoretic
motivation for this work, it would be interesting to examine core-stable coalition structures rather
than just optimal ones. It is not known whether there exists a PTAS4 for planar graphs or
not. Though one might hope to obtain such a PTAS by combining Baker’s approach with our
algorithm for solving bounded treewitdh graphs, such a direct approach fails5. Finally, it would be
interesting to examine other classes of graphs where one can solve the coalition structure generation
in polynomial time. Also, similar tractability results for coalition structure generation could be
devised by using other representation languages.
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5 Appendix I: Detailed Proofs
Theorem 3 OPT-CS-WGG is NP-complete, and assuming P 6= NP, there is no polynomial time
O(n1/2−)-approximation algorithm for it where n is the number of vertices and  is any positive
constant. There is no polynomial time O(n1−)-approximation algorithm for this problem unless
NP = ZPP.
Proof. We reduce an Independent Set instance G = 〈V,E〉 to a OPT-CS-WGG instance. The
reduced graph G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉 contains all the vertices and edges of G (so V ⊆ V ′ and E ⊆ E′),
and one additional vertex s. The weights of the original edges are identical, and are all w(e) = −k
where k > |V |. Vertex s is connected to any vertex in v ∈ V with an edge e with weight w(e) = 1.
Graph G has an independent set of size k iff there exists a partition for graph G′ with value k.
If G has an independent set S with size k, we can create a coalition structure CS with value k
as follows. We put (the additional) vertex s, and the k vertices in set S in one coalition. For every
other vertex v /∈ S, we make a separate coalition with only vertex v in it, so the rest of the vertices
are put in n−k separate coalitions where n is the number of vertices of graph G. A coalition with
one vertex has value zero. Thus the value of the whole coalition structure is equal to the value of
the coalition that includes s. There is no negative edge between vertices of this coalition, because
set S is an independent set in graph G. There are k edges with weight +1 in this coalition, so the
value of the coalition structure is equal to k.
On the other hand, if the optimal coalition structure has value k′ in graph G′, we can find an
independent set of size k′ in G. We note that the absolute value of a negative edge is more than
the sum of all positive edge weights because there are n = |V | positive edges with weight +1. We
have the option of putting each vertex in a separate coalition and achieving value zero. Thus,
we never put a negative edge in a coalition in the optimal coalition structure, as this obtains a
negative value. Thus, the value of the optimal coalition structure is the number of positive edges
we get through the coalitions. However, all positive edges are between vertex s and the other
vertices, so the value of the coalitions is the number of vertices from graph G that we put in the
coalition of vertex s. We can safely put the rest of the vertices in separate coalitions as there are
no positive edges between them, so there is no benefit in putting them in the same coalition. In
the optimal solution the vertices we put in the same coalition as vertex s have no negative edges
between them, so they form an independent set in graph G.
From the analysis, we conclude that the above-mentioned is a parsimony reduction between
the independent set problem and the OPT-CS-WGG problem. H˚astad proved that there exists
no polynomial time O(n1/2−)-approximation algorithm for independent set problem assuming
P 6= NP, he also proved that there is no polynomial time O(n1−)-approximation algorithm for it
unless NP = ZPP [18]. So the same hardness results work for the OPT-CG-WGG problem. For
additional discussion of optimal coalition structures in graph games, see [2].
Theorem 5 OPT-CS-WGG in planar graphs is NP-complete.
Proof. We use a reduction from the Independent Set problem restricted to planar graphs, which
is also NP-complete [16]. Given a planar graph G = 〈V,E〉, we transform the corresponding
Independent Set instance it to the following planar OPT-CS-WGG instance 〈V ′, E′, w〉. Each
node i ∈ V of degree d is replaced with gadget Gi with 2d + 1 nodes and 4d edges. This gadget
can be thought of as a d-sided polygon whose sides correspond to edges in N (i) ≡ {(i, j) ∈ E}
(figure 1(a) shows an example for d = 4). The side corresponding to e has nodes i−e , ie, i+e ∈ V ′
arranged in the clockwise order. Note, if e, e′ ∈ E are two consecutive edges in N (i) taken in the
clockwise order then i+e = i
−
e′ . Gadget Gi also has the center node i ∈ V ′ connected to all other 2d
nodes of Gi. The edge weights are as follows: w(i
−
e , ie) = w(ie, i
+
e ) = −dC where C is a sufficiently
large constant (namely, C > |V |), and the weights of edges from i to other nodes in Gi are +C,
except for one edge (i, i+e ) which has weight C + 1. Here edge e ∈ N (i) can be chosen arbitrarily.
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Figure 1: (a) node i ∈ V of degree d = 4 transformed to gadget Gi. (b),(c) are feasible partitionings
of Gi. (b) encodes the event that i is in the independent set, while (c) encodes the opposite event.
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Figure 2: Each edge (i, j) ∈ E is transformed to gadget Ge consisting of three subgraphs Gβ, Gα,
Gβ of figure 3.
Each edge e = (i, j) ∈ E is transformed to gadget Ge as shown in figure 2. Note, Ge involves
nodes i−e , i+e , j−e , j+e and some internal nodes which are connected only to nodes in Ge.
Given a coalition structure CS in 〈V ′, E′〉, we denote vi(CS) and ve(CS) to be the contribution
to the total cost of subgraphs Gi and Ge respectively; thus, v(CS) =
∑
i∈V vi(CS)+
∑
e∈E ve(CS).
We also denote v∗i = max vi(CS) and v
∗
e = max ve(CS). We say that coalition structure CS is
feasible for Gi if vi(CS) > v
∗
i − C, and it is feasible for Ge if ve(CS) > v∗e − C. We denote ∼ to
be the equivalence relation on V ′ induced by CS.
Consider node i ∈ V of degree d. It can be seen that v∗i = dC + 1, and CS is feasible for
Gi iff exactly one of the following holds: (1) i
+
e ∼ i and ie  i for all e ∈ N (i) (in which case
vi(CS) = v
∗
i ), or (2) i
+
e  i and ie ∼ i for all e ∈ N (i) (in which case vi(CS) = v∗i − 1). These
cases are illustrated in figure 1(b,c). Case (1) will encode the event that i is in the independent
set, and case (2) will encode the opposite event.
Let S∗ be a maximum independent set in 〈V,E〉. We define coalition structure CS∗ as follows:
(i) for each i ∈ V select a feasible partitioning of Gi according to S; nodes of Gi not connected to
the center node i are assigned to singleton partitions. Partitions in graphs Gi, Gj for i 6= j do not
overlap. (ii) For each e = (i, j) ∈ E select partitioning of Ge that does not affect the equivalence
relations between nodes in {i−e , i+e , j−e , j+e } and has the maximum possible value of ve(CS∗) among
such partitionings.
Consider edge e = (i, j) ∈ E. We prove two facts:
(a) ve(CS
∗) = v∗e , and thus v(CS∗) =
∑
i∈S∗ v
∗
i +
∑
i∈V−S∗(v
∗
i − 1) +
∑
e∈E v
∗
e =
∑
i∈V v
∗
i +∑
e∈E v
∗
e + |S∗| − |V |.
(b) If CS is feasible for Gi, Gj and Ge then i and j cannot be both in the independent set,
i.e. either i ∼ ie or j ∼ je.
This will imply that CS∗ is an optimal coalition structure, and so solving constructed OPT-
CS-WGG instance will recover |S∗|. Indeed, if v(CS) ≥ v(CS∗) for some CS then v(CS) >∑
i∈V v
∗
i +
∑
e∈E v
∗
e −C. Thus, vi(CS) > v∗i −C for all i ∈ V and ve(CS) > v∗e −C for all e ∈ V ,
and so CS is feasible for all gadgets Gi and Ge. This means that CS defines some set S ⊆ V , and
by property (b) this set is independent, implying v(CS) ≤∑i∈S v∗i +∑i∈V−S(v∗i −1)+∑e∈E v∗e =∑
i∈V v
∗
i +
∑
e∈E v
∗
e + |S| − |V | ≤ v(CS∗).
To prove (a) and (b), we first analyze optimal partitionings of graphs Gα and Gβ specified in
figure 3.
Graph Gα Let vα(CS) be the contribution of Gα to the total cost. If the restriction of CS
to Gα is as shown in figure 3(b,c,d) then vα(CS) = 6C. This is the maximum possible cost, i.e.
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Figure 3: (a) Topology of graphs Gα and Gβ. The weights in Gα are as follows: for solid edges
w(a, b) = w(b, x) = w(x, x′) = w(x′, a) = w(x′, a′) = w(a′, b′) = +2C, for internal dashed edges
w(a, x) = w(b, x′) = w(x′, b′) = −2C, and for horizontal side edges w(a, a′) = w(b, b′) = −8C. The
weights in Gβ are the same except for two edges: w(a, b) = w(a
′, b′) = +C. (b),(c),(d) are optimal
partitionings of Gα, and (b),(c) are optimal partitionings of Gβ.
v∗α ≡ max vα(CS) = 6C. Indeed, the subgraph induced by nodes {a, b, x, x′} cannot contribute
cost larger than 4C, and the subgraph induced by nodes {a′, b′, x′} cannot contribute cost larger
than 2C. Clearly, we must have a  a′ and b  b′, otherwise vα(CS) ≤ v∗α − 2C. Assuming that
these conditions hold, 4 cases are possible:
(i) a ∼ b, a′  b′;
(ii) a  b, a′ ∼ b′;
(iii) a ∼ b, a′ ∼ b′;
(iv) a  b, a′  b′.
In the first 3 cases there exist a partitioning CS of Gα with vα(CS) = v
∗
α (see figure 3(b,c,d)).
In case (iv), however, we have vα(CS) ≤ v∗α − 2C. Indeed, edges (a, b) and (a′, b′) are not con-
tributed, and subgraphs induced by {a, b, x, x′} and {a′, b′, c′} contribute not more than 4C and
2C respectively. Furthermore, if the first subgraph contributes more than 2C then we must have
a ∼ x′ and thus a′  x′, so the second subgraph does not contribute.
Graph Gβ Again we must a  a′ and b  b′, otherwise vβ(CS) ≤ v∗β −C. Assume that these
conditions hold. Then in cases (i), (ii) there exist a partitioning CS of Gβ with vβ(CS) = v
∗
β (as
shown in figure 3(b,c)), and in cases (iii), (iv) we have vα(CS) ≤ v∗α − C. This can derived by
observing that Gβ is obtained from Gα by subtracting weight C from edges (a, a
′) and (b, b′), and
applying the analysis for Gα above.
We are now ready to prove properties (a) and (b). We use the notation from figure 2. It can
be checked v∗e = v∗β +v
∗
α+v
∗
β, and we have the following: CS is feasible for Ge ⇔ ve(CS) = v∗e
⇔ v∗α(CS) = vα, v∗β(CS) = vβ for both copies of graph Gβ involved in Ge.
(a) Let ∼ be the equivalence relation induced by CS∗. Three cases are possible:
• i /∈ S∗, j /∈ S∗. Then i−e  i+e , j−e  j+e , and so we can choose a partitioning CS of Ge with
ve(CS) = v
∗
e by compositing optimal partitionings (c), (d), (b) from figure 3 for the three
subgraphs Gβ, Gα, Gβ respectively. Clearly, these partitionings are consistent with each
other; we have a ∼ b and a′ ∼ b′.
• i ∈ S∗, j /∈ S∗. Then i−e ∼ i+e , j−e  j+e , and so we can choose a partitioning CS of Ge with
ve(CS) = v
∗
e by compositing optimal partitionings (b), (c), (b) from figure 3 for the three
subgraphs Gβ, Gα, Gβ respectively. Clearly, these partitionings are consistent with each
other; we have a  b and a′ ∼ b′.
• i /∈ S∗, j ∈ S∗. Then i−e  i+e , j−e ∼ j+e , and so we can choose a partitioning CS of Ge with
ve(CS) = v
∗
e by compositing optimal partitionings (c), (b), (c) from figure 3 for the three
subgraphs Gβ, Gα, Gβ respectively. Clearly, these partitionings are consistent with each
other; we have a ∼ b and a′  b′.
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(b) Suppose that CS is feasible for Gi, Gj , Ge and i, j are both in the independent set implying
i−e ∼ i+e and j−e ∼ j+e . For graphs Gβ we can only have cases (i) and (ii), therefore a  b and
a′  b′. Thus, we have case (iv) for graph Gα - a contradiction.
6 Appendix II: Why Baker’s Approach [7] Does Not Yield a
PTAS for Planar Graphs
Baker’s approach [7] and other decomposition theorems [12] have been used to partition vertices
or edges of a planar graph and more generally a minor free graph into an arbitrary number of
sets such that removing any of these sets results a bounded treewidth graph. Many problems are
tractable for bounded treewidth graphs, so this technique is quite powerful for domains where each
set in the decomposition is small enough so that deleting it does not cause extreme changes in
the optimal solution. One might hope that the same approach would allow obtaining a PTAS for
the optimal coalition structure in planar graphs. We show why a direct solution based on Baker’s
approach can not be used to get a PTAS, and discuss why other decomposition theorems are not
helpful in this setting as well.
We first briefly explain Baker’s approach of finding disjoint subsets of edges of the graph such
that the deletion of any of these sets of edges results a bounded treewidth graph. Take an arbitrary
vertex v, and consider the BFS tree rooted at v. Let Li be the set of vertices at distance i from
v, let l be the number of these sets, i.e. l is the maximum distance from v. These sets are called
“layers”. For any integer number k, and i < k, if we remove the edges between sets Li+jk and
L1+i+jk for all 0 ≤ j ≤ l/k, the resulting graph would have treewidth O(k) (see [13] for a proof).
Therefore removing edges between layers Li+jk and L1+i+jk for all 0 ≤ j ≤ l/k gives us a bounded
treewidth graph for which we have a polynomial time exact algorithm.
Let Ei be the set of edges between layers Li+jk and L1+i+jk for all 0 ≤ j ≤ l/k. Baker’s
approach provides k disjoint sets E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 such that deleting any Ei gives us an O(k)
bounded treewidth graph. If the sets generated by Baker’s algorithm were a partition, we would
get a PTAS for planar graphs. Unfortunately, these k sets do not form a partition of edges of the
graph. They are disjoint, but their union is not all the edges, since there may be edges inside each
layer which are not in any of these k sets. We now discuss how such an approach would work if
{Ei}k−1i=0 were a partition and explain where it fails when {Ei}k−1i=0 is not a partition.
Consider the case where the above {Ei}k−1i=0 is a partition. For any i, we can modify the
optimal solution to avoid all edges in set Ei, while decreasing the solution’s quality. Assume
that the optimum solution partitions the vertices of the graph into t sets S1, S2, . . . , St. Let
Eopt be the set of edges covered in this optimum solution. When removing the edges in Ei
we obtain a graph with some connected components. In each connected component, we can
use the optimum solution’s partitioning to partition the vertices. We use the projection of the
optimum solution’s partition in each connected component. In this new partitioning, we cover
all edges that the optimum solution covers except the ones in Ei. Note that this new partition
is a feasible solution in the graph G \ Ei (the graph G after removing the edges in Ei). Since
graph G \ Ei has bounded treewidth, we can find its optimum solution in polynomial time. This
solution has value at least
∑
e∈Eopt w(e) −
∑
e∈Eopt∩Ei w(e) (the value of the solution derived
by projecting the optimum solution in each connected component of G \ Ei). We can find the
optimum solution in G \ Ei for each 0 ≤ i < k. The average of these k solutions is at least:∑k−1
i=0
[∑
e∈Eopt w(e)−
∑
e∈Eopt∩Ei w(e)
]
k =
k
∑
e∈Eopt w(e)−
∑k−1
i=0
∑
e∈Eopt∩Ei w(e)
k
Unfortunately, the sets {Ei}k−1i=0 are disjoint but do not form a partition. An approach based
on Baker’s algorithm works when
∑k−1
i=0
∑
e∈Eopt∩Ei w(e) is at most
∑
e∈Eopt w(e). However, this
may not hold since there are negative edges in the graph, and possibly in the optimum solution
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as well. It might be the case that the positive edges in the optimum solution are shared with
sets Ei’s, and the negative edges of the optimum solution are not in any set Ei. In this case, we
can not obtain any good upper bound on
∑k−1
i=0
∑
e∈Eopt∩Ei w(e), and it may even be larger than
k
∑
e∈Eopt w(e), so we may gain nothing through this approach.
The key problem in the above approach is that the sets of edges in Baker’s approach do not
form a partition of edges of the graph: they are disjoint sets, but do not span all the edges. In
particular, the edges between two consecutive layers are covered by Baker’s approach, and the
edges inside each layer are not present in any set. Thus, if all edges between two layers have
weight +∞ and the edges inside each layer have weight −∞, we can not find any reasonable upper
bound on
∑k−1
i=0
∑
e∈Eopt∩Ei w(e) in terms of the optimum solution.
Other decomposition theorems, such as [12], are also not very helpful for similar reasons. For
example, Theorem 3.1 in [12] states that we can partition the vertices of a minor free graph into
k sets such that the deletion of any of these sets results a bounded treewidth graph. One might
hope there exists one of these k sets whose deletion does not effect the optimal solution by a factor
of more than 1 − 1/k. A counterexample is when all positive edges in the optimal solution are
between these k sets, and the negative edges of the optimal solution are inside these k sets. Again,
the absolute value of the weights of all edges may be much larger than the value of the optimal
solution. In this case, removing these k sets affects the positive edges more than the negative
edges, which can have a huge effect the value of the solution. In particular, if we remove each
of these k sets once, every (positive) edge between two sets is “removed” twice (for each of its
endpoints), and every (negative) edge inside a set is “removed” only once.
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